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This paper discusses three areas identified as regulatory imperfections in the 
framework of insider trading in New Zealand. The first point of discussion 
focuses on the inherent difficulty in identifying the actual offence of insider 
trading and the associated difficulties in identifying the elements of the offence. 
The conclusion reached is that serious evidential difficulties diminish the 
effectiveness of the proscriptive provisions of the Securities Amendment Act 
1988 ("the Act"). The second issue discussed is that commercial reality and 
efficiency demands a pragmatic application of the Act where possible. The third 
area of analysis focuses on the inherent problems associated with enforcing the 
provisions of the Act. The conclusion reached is that the nature of insider trading 
is such that the only way to successfully address the problem is through 
centralised action. 
The text of this paper ( excluding contents page, footnotes, bibliography and 
annexures) comprises approximately 12,500 words. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
Insider trading laws are normally evaluated in terms of their 
effectiveness at proscribing the occurrence of trading on 
misappropriated non-public information. The Securities Amendment 
Act 1988 ("the Act") is designed to eliminate insider trading on 
securities listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Essentially the 
Act prohibits an insider who obtains price-sensitive information by 
virtue of his or her position as an insider from dealing in securities 
or tipping (recommending the purchase or sale of securities to other 
traders) until the information 1s published or otherwise reflected in 
market prices . Although insider trading is not a criminal offence 111 
New Zealand , the insider is liable to pay damages to the party with 
whom he or she deals and a penalty to the insider's own company. I 
New Zealand's framework for insider trading liability is parallel to 
the Au stralian legislation in its base premise that 
should have equal access to material information. 
market participant 
The insider in 
possession of inside information 1s presumed to have an unfair 
advantage over other market traders who cannot obtain the same 
access to information . To remedy this unfairness the premise that 
there should be parity among market participants is supported and 
forms the basis of the legislative framework 111 New Zealand . 
Essentially the framework prohibits trading based on inside 
information because possession of the inside information confers an 
unerodible advantage on the trader. This unerodible advantage if 
abused creates inequities 111 the market place . Effectively then the 
legis~ation attempts to enforce a framework that achieves parity of 
information among market participants. 2 
I Section 7(2) Securities Amendment Act 1988 
2This feature of insider trading regulation is illustrated by American 
developments under which the proscription is based on the idea that the 
insider stands in a fiduciary relationship to market investors and therefore 
owes a duty to disclose before trading. Chiarella v United States, 445 U.S. 222 
( 1980) . Chiarella was immediately perceived as not providing sufficient 
proscriptive framework and accordingly the theory based on the 
misappropriation of another's information was developed: United States v 
Ne1V111a11 664 F 2d 12 (2d Cir. 1981) 
t..,t.W USP..•,RY 
Vl~i.TORIA U~JIVERSI TY Of Vi~LLJ..,•C. tut-. 
2 
The focus on achieving parity of information 111 the New Zealand 
context can be contrasted with the United States (the "US") position 
which bases its proscriptive framework on prohibiting misuse of 
inside information. In the US context liability arises where there has 
been a fraudulent mi ·use of another parties confidential 
information.3 It is suggested that the basis for insider trading 
liability is important because it defines the ambit and effectiveness of 
the proscription. 'This paper questions whether our legislation in its 
current form goes far enough to address the real problems associated 
with insider trading. 
The conclusion drawn is that there are regulatory imperfections with 
New Zealand's current insider trading framework . It 1s suggested 
however, that by simply directing the critique to the current 
regulatory framework, crucial underlying 
addressed by the framework are overlooked. 
problems not actually 
The result is that the 
effectiveness of insider trading proscriptions are greatly 
overestimated; in actual fact only targeting a fraction of the types of 
activities that can create market unfairness and inefficiencies.4 A 
further undesirable result 1s that as prospective participants 111 the 
securities market become more aware of the tactics available for 
evasion of the insider trading sanctions, the existing framework will 
become increasingly ineffective and irrelevant. To avoid these 
results, this paper examines the problems with our present regulation 
of insider trading with particular emphasis on the difficulties 
associated with tipping transactions. 
A study is made of the evidential problems inherent in establishing a 
successful case. The evidential difficulties are shown to highlight the 
inconsistencies present 111 the framework. The paper goes examines 
the US development of case law under the anti-fraud provisions of the 
3Rule I Ob Securities Exchange Act 1934 
-4 SR Salbu "Tipper Credibility. non informational 
Abstention From Trading" (1993) Washington Law Review Yol 68. 
Tip pee 
p 315 
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3 
Securities Exchange Act I 934. The suggestion is made the a pragmatic 
development of insider trading Jaws 1s required 111 New Zealand to 
avoid fettering market activity and efficiency. 
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II REGULATORY APPROACHES TO THE PROBLEM OF INSIDER 
TRADING 
There are two platforms on which to erect a framework for insider 
trading proscription. The first 1s that market participants should 
have equal access to material information; or that parity of 
information 111 the market place is desirable5 . The seco.D.Q_ is that 
inside information is presumed to have been produced for the public 
issuer's gain (not for the gain of the inside trader) therefore the 
legislation should pro ,cribe the misuse of information by inside 
traders. The suggestion 1s that the protection of material pnce 
sensitive inside information 111 this way is in fact 
efficiency. 6 
essential to market 
5 Informational efficiency of the equity market requires that all information be 
equally available throughout the market so that share prices reflect the totality 
of information in the market. (sec further Keane, Stock Market Efficiency 
( 1983)) 
6A successful regulatory regime must balance the tension that exists between 
the legislative inclination to regulate everything and the market's preference 
for minimal government intervention. The guiding principle is "how best to 
meet public expectations." Market "efficiency" is achieved by promoting 
investor confidence and increasing participation in securities markets. ic. 
inspiring the confidence of investors in the fairness and integrity of the market 
without over regulating and thereby suppressing market responsiveness and 
creativity. The essence of the argument that insider trading improves market 
efficiency is the point that all informed trading. regardless of whether the 
information behind it is public, renders pricing in a large, anonymous 
marketplace more efficient by expediting the assimilation of a maximum of 
relevant information. (See further Henry Manne. Insider Trading and the Stock 
Market ( 1966), L Stout, "The unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic 
Analysis of Stock Market Pricing and Securities Regulation" , 87 Mich. L. Rev. 
613(1988)) 
4 
A Parity of Information 
Parity of information among investors ensures that no one insider 
has an unerodible advantage over other investors who cannot obtain 
the same information. Insider trading legislation in New Zealand is 
based on the premise that insider trading including tipping should be 
regulated because it preempts or aggrogates 7 a prtce otherwise 
available to others.8 It is suggested however that this analysis is 
problematic. It 1s not effective to suggest that insider trading 1s 
inherently unfair to other investors on this rationalization and 
should therefore be prohibited. 
prejudice other investors in the market? 
Does insider trading actually 
It is often stated that insider trading harms investors and that 
shareholders should be treated identically. Take for example the 
following hypothetical. There are I 00 shares in Company A trading 
at $10 per share. Insider A knows that a takeover wi II be made the 
next day at $15 per share. Insider A buys I O shares in Company A 
from party B at $JO per share reselling the shares the next day at $15 
per share making a gain of $50. The other original shareholders in 
Company A obtain a $5 profit per share on their shareholding. It is 
difficult to identify who has been injured by the inside trading in this 
simple example. B 's decision to sell was arguably unaffected by what 
insider A knew or failed to disclose; B would arguably have pursued its 
trading plan regardless of A 's actions. 
Although the insider's trading does have an impact on the supply and 
demand for the security traded in, it cannot be said that the trading is 
7The inside trader has an impact on the supply and demand for the securities 
traded in ; by trading on inside information the insider may purchase or sell 
securities at a lower buy price or at a higher sale price before the opportunity 
is afforded to other market participants. The prices are effectively manipulated 
by the insider trading; in other words a different buy or sell price would have 
been available to the other investors if the insider had abstained from trading. 
8until the relevant information is publi hed or otherwise reflected in market 
prices, the insider can derive a benefit from the trading on such information; a 
benefit not available to other security traders . 
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unfair because the trading distorts the true price of the shares. It is 
pure speculation as to what price would have been available to 
investors had the insider not traded. When it is considered that 
insiders are permitted to preempt a price available to other investors 
by trading when they are not in the possession of inside information, 
why should they be prohibited from trading while possessing inside 
information? The answer and the mischief must lie elsewhere; In 
the need to protect property rights. 
The unerodible advantage held by A in the above example; or the 
abuse to B is not A 's ability to trade on the information but is simply A 
's possession of the information and the unauthorized use of it to B 's 
eventual detriment. The policy that insider trading regulation drives 
off must be to regulate the misuse of inside information to the 
detriment of other market traders and the public issuer (owner of the 
information). 
B Protection of Inside Information 
Material confidential information is valuable . The public issuer 1s the 
proprietary owner of the value of the inside information which 
demands protection. The US experience highlights the mischief 
inherent in the misuse of confidential information. In FMC Corp v 
Boesky9 FMC's investment Banker Boesky had secretly advised FMC to 
increase by $ I O the consideration to be offered 111 its restructuring . 
On the basis of this information 1 0 Boesky undertook massive 
purchases of FMC stock for the purpose of forcing a higher price . 
Boesky also tipped other investors who made significant purchases of 
stock. The trading drove FMC stock to a level that did in fact cause FMC 
to increase the cash amount to be offered, thereby producing a $20 
Million gain to Boesky. 
9Fed Sec L Rep 92 .233 (ND I I I 1991) 
1 OThe law does currently recognise property rights in the type of information 
which is involved in insider trading cases eg. the advice given by Boesky to 
FMC. These rights are in legal remedies for disclosure. misuse of confidential 
information and breach of fiduciary duty. 
6 
The case 1s illustrative of the impact of insider trading and tipping on 
the property rights of the entity for whose benefit or enterprise the 
information upon which the insider trades was created. 1 I Clearly 
Boesky used FMC information to his benefit and to FMC's detriment. If 
Boesky had not traded on the information the stock may not have 
increased and FMC would not have paid the higher price. Boesky and 
associates undertook massive purchases of FMC stock for the purpose 
of causing FMC's management to approve the higher price. The facts 
support the fact that their purchases accounted for more than 50% of 
the trading volume during a one month period. 1 2 The case is 
illustrative of the tangible harm resulting from the misappropriation 
of another's information. Effectively FMC incurred a US $220 Million 
in addition payments incidental to its restructuring as a direct result 
of Boesky's unauthorized trading. 
The United States Supreme Court in Carpenter v United States 13 gave a 
clearly reasoned opinion focusing on the protection of another's 
information. The case concerned insider Winan and his accomplices 
who were convicted of mail fraud on proof that they had 
misappropriated their advance knowledge of the contents of the Wall 
Street Journal's 'Heard on the Street' column which Winan co-
authored for its publisher. The Court emphasised the publisher's 
interest 111 the confidentiality of the contents, recognizing this 
information as a property right capable of protection 14: 
"Confidential information acquired by a corporation 111 the course 
and conduct of its business is a species of property to which the 
corporation has the exclusive right andbenefit. and which a court of 
equity will protect through the injunctive process or other 
appropriate remedy." 
I I G Walker, B Fisse (eds) Securities Regulations in Australia & Nell' Zealand ( I 
ed , Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1994) 625 
I 2Above n 11, 623 
13434 us 19 ( 1987) 
14Above nl3 , 26 
7 
It is suggested that the basis of insider trading regulation should not 
be justified 111 the interests of protecting investors or security 
markets, but rather the property interests 111 the information's 
confidentiality. 
C The New Zealand Approach 
The focus of the New Zealand insider trading framework is clearly on 
ensuring that there is parity 111 the market and thereby protection 
for investors . For example on the facts of Boes ky, the focus of 
Boesky's liability would be on 2 limbs. First whether Boesky was an 
insider and secondly whether the information was inside 
information . If these 2 limbs are not satisfied, Boesky would bear no 
liability . The analysis is concerned to prevent Boesky (insider 111 
possession of inside information) from trading on a more 
advantageous playing field then other market players . 
In the New Zealand context liability does not depend on whether there 
has been an adverse dealing with confidential information to the 
detriment of the owner of the information. Furthermore there is no 
consideration as to whether disclosed information actually breaches 
fiduciary obligations. The considerations focus solely on prohibiting 
an insider from trading on inside information thereby ensuring that 
all investors are trading on the same level ; rather than whether 
proprietary rights in the information should be protected . 
It is submitted that because of its focus the New Zealand regime 
significantly limited and indeed inadequate to deal with the potential 
abuses of Q.!.Q.llrietary righ_!:,. To illustrate this, the following is an 
analysis of some of the startling problems in New Zealand's present 
regulatory framework . Essentially there are three areas of difficulty. 
First the problems associated with detecting the offence. 
The evidential problem 111 establishing that tipping activity has 
occurred in some instance is shown to be insurmountable . Because of 
8 
the evidential difficulties, some areas of inside trading are not 
adequately addressed by the proscriptive framework. Secondly the 
problems associated with implementation of the legislation are 
addressed. On inspection of the US development in relation to the 
anti-fraud legislation, the suggestion is made that concerted effort 
must be made to ensure that the New Zealand regime develops in a 
commercially sensible manner. Thirdly the problems associated with 
the enforcement of the statutory framework are examined rn light of 
recent New Zealand decisions. The suggestion made 1s that the 
present regime is inadequate to deal effectively with insider trading 
activity. Suggestions are offered as to possible approaches that could 
be considered to deal with the regulatory imperfections identified. 
III 
A 
1 
THE PROBLEMATIC NATURE OF THE CURRENT 
REGULATORY APPROACH 
Difficulties rn 
Insider Trading 
Establishing the Elements of 
Tipping: The nature of the tip 
A corporate insider owing a fiduciary duty to the company (either as 
a principal officer, employee or substantial security holder) is bound 
by the duty to abstain from trading on inside information. I .5 A tippee 
( a person who receives inside information from a person having c! 
fiduciary relationship with the public issuer) IS liable for trading 
only if the information is received ITI confidence. I 6 If information IS 
received ITI confidence, the receiver is considered to be an "insider" 
----and is therefore liable (other requirements being fulfilled) to the 
provisions of the Act. Arguably the requirement that the information 
1 5 An insider's liability for dealing is 
Amendment Act 1988 
111 section 7 of the Securities 
1 6 An insider's tipping liability is found in sections 9 and 13 of the Securities 
Amendment Act 1988 
9 
be received tn confrcfence for insider trading liability to arise reflects 
a policy that the framework should not be too concerned with 
preserving macro level market integrity but should focus on specific 
transactional fraud. 17 
Take for example the following hypothetical. One Saturday while 
watching a rugby match from the sideline A inadvertently 
overhears B relaying sensitive inside information to C in respect of a 
takeover of Company X. Because A overhears the information in a 
public place, A is not liable for trading on that information 
particularly as the information was not imparted to A with the 
necessary degree of confidence. The insider trading laws are not 
concerned with restricting A 's use of the information because A is 
not an "insider" or one rece1v1ng the information in confidence. As a · 
result the blatant misuse of another's confidential information is left 
unsanctioned. A cannot be sued and even though A may be holding 
all the trading profits, A will be entitled to keep them. 
J 
If C were to trade on the other hand, C would have the same liability as 
B, both parties falling with~n the definition of _5ru.ider" . Ironically 
however B, the party who simply tipped freely without deriving any 
advantage from the tip wi II be significantly worse off than C who in 
fact trades. C having traded and profited will effectively be returned 
to C 's original position by having to compensate by returning 
trading profits. Any liability and corresponding compensation 
required from B however is effectively a penalty because B would not 
have collected any profits which could be used to compensate any 
injured party. 
2 The "in confidence "requirement : Evidential difficulties 
As alluded to above where there is no fiduciary relationship between 
the giver and the receiver of the information, the crucial question is 
17 Above n4, 3 12 
10 
whether the information was communicated in circumstances 
importing an obligation of confidence. 1 8 It is suggested that no 
obligation arises if the giver of the information does not intend that 
there should be any obligation of confidence imposed on the 
recipient of the information. Take for example a case where 
information is provided by a company to a financial analyst in the 
full knowledge and expectation that the analyst would use the 
information freely. In this example, no obligation would attach to the 
analyst. If on the other hand the company gives the analyst the 
information and there is a general expectation that the information 
will not be published generally, the analyst may be at risk if he or 
she trades prior to the information becoming public. 
There is a fine line to be drawn and whether or not liability attaches; 
liability will depend strictly on the context in which the information 
is received. Because of the requirement that information be received 
111 confidence, the ambit of liability is significantly limited because 
of the difficulties of proof. Essentially the "in confidence" 
requirement limits the ambit of liability creating insurmountable 
evidential di fficu !ties. 
The defect 1n the New Zealand proscriptive framework is that it does 
not provide a means to compel the requisite evidence. The single most 
important aspect of the Securities Exchange Commission's ("the SEC") 
enforcement power in the United States is its broad ability to obtain 
information from anyone 111 the United States. 1 9 Once a matter is 
identified as appropriate for investigation, there is no impediment, 
except for privileged communications and the right against self-
incrimination, that will hamper the SEC's ability to get to the evidence 
it seeks.20 Unlike the US regime, the New Zealand regulatory system 
I 8AB Consolidated Ltd v Europe Strength Food Co Ptd Ltd [ 1978] 2 NZLR 515 
I 9 Michael D Mann, "What Constitutes a Successful Securities Regulatory 
Regime?" Australian Journal of Corporate Law Yo 13. No.2 185 
20Above 1119,185 
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does not have the tool s to effectively identify and gather the evidence 
necessary to prosecute insider traders . 
3 Practical illustrations of difficulties of proof 
A US case that illustrates the difficulties of proof inherent with the 
"in confidence" requirement is United States v Chestman.21 In that 
case, Ira Waldbaum and his family, who owned 51 % of the stock of 
Waldbaum Inc . entered into an agreement to sell all their stock to the 
A & P supermarket chain for $50 a share. on the condition that A & P 
then make a tender offer for the remaining stock at the same pnce. 
Before the agreement was publicly announced, Ira told his sister 
Shirley, who in turn told her daughter Susan, who in turn told her 
husband Keith, each telling the other not to tell anyone outside the 
family because that "could ruin the sale." Keith called his broker 
Chestman and told him that he "had some definite, some accurate 
information" that Waldbaum was being sold at a "substantially 
higher" price than the current market and asked Chestman what he 
should do. Chestman was aware that Keith was married to a Waldbaum 
niece. During the morning , Chestman purchased I I ,OOO shares of 
Waldbaum stock for himself and his discretionary accounts at prices 
ranging from $24.65 to $26 a share. When the tender offer was 
announced later that day, the price of Waldbaum stock rose to $49 a 
share. 
IOb-5. 
Chestman was convicted of violations to insider trading Rule 
The conviction was rever ed on appeal. The court held that evidence 
that Keith Loeb revealed the critical information in breach of a duty 
of trust and confidence known to Chestman IS essential to the 
imposition of liability on Chestman as tippee. Such evidence was 
lacking on the facts of the case. Although Chestman was aware that 
Loeb was a member of the Waldbaum family there was simply no 
evidence that he knew that Loeb was imparting the information tn 
2 I 903 F.2d 75 (2d Cir. I 990) 
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confidence. The facts of the case highlight the obstacles to proving 
the requisite "in confidence" element of a tipping action. 
To more clearly illustrate the inconsistencies inherent 111 tipping 
liability consider the following simple hypothetical ("case one"). 
Director A is an insider of Public Issuer X. Director A is friends with 
and plays golf with Outsider B. While out playing golf one day A 
discloses to B that a formal takeover offer has been put to X. The 
price offered for the shares of X is 111 fact $5 per share above market 
value. On receipt of this information B purchases I OOO shares in X . B 
makes an off market transaction through B 's broker. The broker 
records and share transfer subsequently show that B purchased 
shares from C (shareholder of X). Following the takeover B sells the 
shares and profits. C meanwhile is indignant. Had C known of the 
proposed takeover, C would not have sold the shares prior to the 
takeover to B. Although C received market price for the shares, C did 
not receive the price that would have been received had full 
disclosure been made . C decides to pursue and action under section 
7(2)(a) of the Act. 
C's case is that B is an insider under section 3(1 )(c) of the Act having 
received inside information 111 confidence from A (a principal 
officer of the public issuer) . Under section 7(2)(a) of the Act an 
insider of the public iss uer is liable to persons who sell securities to 
that insider and incur a loss. C therefore has a potential claim against 
insider B under section 7(2)(a). There are however, significant and it 
is suggested insurmountable problems of proof that effectively stop C 
from succeeding 111 any claim against B. In order to satisfy the 
elements of liability C would have to prove not only that B received 
inside information from A, but that B received the information in 
confidence. It is unlikely that C will be able to fulfil these critical 
elements of proof. Neither A nor B are likely to divulge to C the 
circumstances in which the information was passed. Essentially then, 
13 
B has no recourse under section 7 against the tippee; the tipping 
activity in this instance goes unchecked.22 
Additionally C has a direct cause of action against the A as tipper 
pursuant to section 9(2)(a) of the Act. The element C must prove to 
be successful however are also impractical if not impossible. C must 
prove that A advised or encouraged B to buy the shares2 3 or 
alternatively that A communicated the information to B knowing or 
believing that B would buy the shares.2 4 rt is doubtful that C will be 
able to ascertain the requisite evidence to satisfy the liability 
requirements of section 9. How would C be able to prove that A 
advised or encouraged B to purchase shares? Even more problematic, 
how is C able to prove that A communicated the information knowing 
that B would purchase shares? 
4 Inconsistent results 
The above analysis highlights the difficulties inherent in proving 
the elements of a tipping action. It is suggested however that the 
difficulties of proof are not intractable 111 every tipping scenario. 
Take for instance the following hypothetical ("case two"). A is a 
director of Public issuer X. A formal offer has been made to X. A 
formally instructs X's solicitor B to provide ongoing advice 111 
relation to the takeover. Privy to the takeover offer and the 
subsequent valuations and realising that the takeover offer 1s 
significantly above market value , B purchases shares in X. B in fact 
purchases off market through a broker and 111 fact purchases C's 
shares. What cause of action does C have in this case? 
2 2 The tipper and tippee as insiders arc also liable to the public issuer under 
section 7(2)(c) however it is unlikely that the public issuer will be successful 
in any claim because of the same difficulties of proof. 
23 Section 9( 1 )(a) 
24 Section 9 ( 1 )(b) 
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Once again C's case is that B is an insider under section 3(1 )(c) of the 
Act having received inside information 111 confidence from A (a 
principal officer of the public issuer). C therefore has a potential 
claim against insider B under section 7(2)(a) if C can prove that B 
received inside information from A in confidence. In this case, there 
would probably be a record of instruction to B which would confirm 
that B received information from A. Also the fact that the 
information was passed in confidence could be satisfied on the facts . 
Unlike the previous scenario, in this case C will probably be able to 
satisfy the critical elements of proof in this case and therefore has 
recourse under section 7 against B for any loss C incurred on the sale 
of shares. Unlike case on in this case C would not have an additional 
cause of action against A as tipper under section 9 of the Act. It 1s 
unlikely that C will be able to assert that A either advised or 
encouraged B to buy shares or that A communicated the information 
to B knowing that B would buy shares. 
The above hypothetical cases highlight the inconsistencies 111 the 
treatment of tipping activity under the present framework; 
inconsistencies that arguably produce inequitable results. In case 
one C has no cause of action against either the tipper or the tipper 
both of whom are insiders . In case two however, C may have a cause 
of action against the tippee. Is the rule against tipper trading 
proscribed 1n sections 7 and 9 of the Act appropriate given the 
inconsistency that arises from its application? 
Arguably it is simply a fact that it is easier 111 some liability cases than 
other to prove the elements of liability. The theory is that it should be 
easier to prove the elements of a case in a case of greater abuse; 
public policy requires it to be so . Arguably as a matter of policy case 
2 above highlights the abuse that the proscription is attempting to 
inhibit; accordingly the inconsistency can be justified on policy 
grounds . In other words the inconsistencies may the theoretical and 
indeed insignificant if we consider that case 2 represents a greater 
abuse; and accept that the legislative proscription although unable to 
15 
effectively proscribe all abuses does adequately address the greatest 
problem. 
5 Impotent system? 
The present framework clearly does not allow an aggrieved 
shareholder to recover from another investor who has abused inside 
information. Essentially, the present tipping regime does not achieve 
the goal of parity of information between market investors because B 
who is in possession of advantage cannot be penalised or prohibited 
from trading with an advantage. The injury to C is a direct result of 
there not being a process by which the evidential requirements for 
the action to can be obtained. Although there is a regulatory system 
111 place, the system is dy s functional as a result of the evidential 
problems. The framework which 1s arguably based on the premise 
that investors should have equal access to information has failed to 
address certain situations where there has been an abuse of position 
resulting in unequal access to information . Can the problems with 
the present system be corrected? 
6 Change of focus required? 
It is suggested that if the focus was to shift from a system striving to 
achieve parity among market participants to one which sought to 
proscribe the misuse of information. the framework may not appear 
as defective. If the focus was on misuse of information what would the 
framework be proscribing? Arguably the proscription would be 
against injury to the owner of the information by the misuse of that 
information. In the above hypothetical cases, arguably there is no 
injury to X. The trading by B does not effect X even if the trading was 
by an insider on the bas is of inside information . The only 111Jury was 
to C, which is of little importance or concern to X. In this light , the 
resultant inconsistencies and evidential difficulties are redundant. 
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B Difficulty in Detecting the Act of Insider Trading 
I On market versus off market transactions 
As illustrated by the two hypotheticals above, there are significant 
proof problems that an aggrieved shareholder must overcome to 
succeed with actions under sections 7 and 9 of the Act. It should be 
emphasised that the examples used however are one that involve off 
market transactions where the counterparty to the transaction could 
be identified. Even with this advantage the difficulties tn the first 
case are insurmountable. If the transactions involved on market 
dealing it would be virtually impossible to detect the relevant 
counterparty to even begin to consider the elements of proof. To 
some extent the difficulties associated with on market transaction are 
discussed below. 
Present liability focuses on 111Jury to a particular party tn a 
transaction rather than market break down that may result from 
unidentifiable transactions. 2 5 Focus on the elements of a particular 
transaction 1s limiting because of the 
associated identifying a cause of action. 
increasing difficulties 
Significant logistical issues 
surround the successful prosecution of insider trading cases because 
the market place naturally depersonalizes exchanges making 
counterparties to transactions anonymous.26 The US framework is 
less restrictive 111 allowing those who trade contemporaneously with 
the defendant (in the relevant shares) to have a civil cause of action 
against the defendant provided they can prove the basic element of 
fraud. The New Zealand situation is more complex as illustrated by the 
experience of one shareholder in the recent Wilson NeiLf27 case. 
25see further Jeffrey P Strickler, "Inside Information and Outside Traders: 
Corporate Recovery of Outsider's Unfair Gain", ( 1985) 73 Cal L Rev 483,5 I 0 
26 Not only is there difficulty in identifying counterpartics, difficulties arise 
in identifying inducement, proving causal nexus between a defendant's acts and 
the plaintiffs ostensible injury 
27 Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Societv Limited v Wilson Neill Limited 
(N o.2)( 1994) 7 NZCLC 260,40 I (CA) 
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2 Colonial Mutual Life 
Wilson Neill Limited 
Assurance Society Limited v 
The Wilson Neill case concerned share dealings (the "dealings") in 
1990 and 1991 in the Company Wilson Neill Ltd (the "Company"). The 
Company had diverse interests; liquor interests in Australia and New 
Zealand. Before the dealings Magnum (now DB Group Ltd, a publicly 
listed Company) held through its subsidiaries around 27% of the 
shares in the Company. Colin Herbert, the Company's chief executive 
owned/controlled 20% of the shares in the Company.28 
Magnum and Herbert entered into negotiations 111 relation to a joint 
venture agreement with a view to combining their interests 111 the 
Company. The plans for a joint venture fell through and instead it 
was decided between the parties that Magnum would purchase 61 
million of the Herbert Group's shares while the remaining 14 million 
shares were made subject to a put option 111 
whereby Magnum was required to purchase 
between 15 and 31 July 1991. 
favour of the Group 
the remaining shares 
The price to be paid for the Herbert shares was 65 cents per share. 2 9 
Magnum discovered soon after that the Company was in much worse a 
position than earlier thought. Interim financial statements for the 
year ended 31 March 1991 showed a small net profit of only $4 Million. 
A financial report was commissioned from Southpac Corporation Ltd 
which painted a bad picture. Having partially paid for the 61 million 
Herbert Group shares and having been advised that there was no 
course of action against the Herbert Group, Magnum completed the 
purchase of the 61 million shares but canceled the put option. The 14 
million shares , the subject of the put option were placed on the 
market. Various institutional and other investors bought shares at 
28 Herbert controlled much of his shareholding through various companies 
29 At the lime shares in the Company were being traded at around 60 cents per 
share 
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around 40 cents.30 The pnce of the shares fell steadily to as low as 10 
cents by the end of 1991. A group of shareholders in the Company 
sought leave to exercise the public issuer's (Wilson Neill Ltd's) right 
of action against perceived insiders in the Company under section 18 
of the Act. 
As stated previously the difficulty that faces an aggrieved 
shareholder is that there must be proof that they are the 
counterparty to the inside trading or tipping . In the Wilson Neill 
case, one private investor Brian Gaynor, investment analyst of 
Auckland documented the delays and problems associated with the 
shareholder remedy provisions of the Act.3 1 The Gaynor situation in 
the Wilson Neill case is illustrative of the difficulties in this respect. 
Gaynor purchased all his 
Buttle Wilson who 111 turn 
holding on the market through brokers 
purchased from Fay Richwhite Equities) 2 
Gaynor was unable to determine who the counterparty to his 
transactions were as Fay Richwhite Equities refused to disclosed the 
identity of the sellers . This resulted in am impasse3 3 as far as 
Gaynor's determinations were concerned. The Securities Commission 
were asked to identify whether Gaynor had indeed purchased from 
insiders . The Commission stated that the counterparties to Gaynor's 
transactions were not insiders and therefore Gaynor had no cause of 
action as an aggrieved shareholder. 
The Young investigation confirmed this position. Yet over a year 
later, Gaynor received advice from Buttle Wilson that the 
counterparty to his transaction was indeed an identified insider and 
that compensation would be forthcoming. The result is a confused 
30The market price of the shares had been falling and was about 40 cents at the 
time of the cancellation and the placement in July 1991 
3 I See "Securities Commission should take a more Proactive Stance" The National 
Business Review, New Zealand, 2 June 1995, p64-65 
32Above n3 I, 65 
33If Gaynor had not had the support of other institutional shareholders and had 
been successful in the section 17 request, the matter might have been halted at 
this point. 
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situation and unacceptable delay tn redressing the situation. The 
confusion and delay result from the inherent practical difficulty tn 
determining counterparties to insider trading transactions . 
There are two methods for determining the counterparties to a share 
transaction. These are the share registry and the sharebroker 
reconciliation methods.3 4 The Securities Commission has stated that 
the sharebroker reconciliation method is the most accurate method of 
determining counterparties to a share transaction:35 
"In our view. the broker records which arc drawn up on the day of 
the transaction, or on the day after. are a more reliable record of 
counterparties to a s hare trade than registry records which tend to 
be entered a week or more later." 
Gaynor received compensation tn June 1994 some 4 years after the 
transactions involving insider trading. As noted by Mr Gaynor, the 
payment received 1s little compensation for the expenses incurred 
over the past 4 years pursuing the case.3 6 The present framework 
leaves the enforcement of the provisions of the Act to the aggrieved 
shareholders. Given the difficulties associated with actually 
identifying the parties to the activity it is clear that the framework is 
inefficient in its present form. 
C 
1 
Commercial Reality 
Approach to Liability 
Requires a Pragmatic 
Rule JOb-5 Securities Exchange Act 1934 
The proscriptive framework for insider trading activity tn the United 
States is illustrative of a pragmatic approach to insider trading. In 
the United States there 1s no specific insider-trading statutory 
provision. 
34 Above n3 I ,65 
35 Above n3 I ,65 
36 Above n3 I ,65 
Rather, insider trading 1s regulated by a general anti-
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fraud statutory provision, Rule I Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act 
1934 which provides: 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly , by the 
use of any means of instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of 
the mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange, 
(a) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to 
state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements 
made , in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, 
not misleading, or 
(c) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person , in 
connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 
Because there is no specific insider-trading statutory provision in the 
United States, insider-trading law has developed through case-law 
which has interpreted Rule IOb-5 . By way of example, in relation to 
tipping activity the US Court have indicated that tipping is only an 
offence if it is improper i.e ., the tipper expects a personal profit or 
other benefit from the tipping.37 The New Zealand legislation does 
not have the equivalent of Rule I Ob-5 which 1s essentially an all 
encompassing anti-fraud prov1s1on under which most American 
tipping and insider trading prosecutions occur.3 8 It is suggested that 
if the New Zealand regulatory system is so statute based there is a 
danger that market activity being shackled. A pragmatic approach is 
required to loosen the bindings . 
2 Market activity fettered 
It has been suggested that the 
Zealand is "pernicious to the 
insider trading proscription in New 
efficient operation of the capital 
market."39 This suggestion is made on the basis that our framework 
37 SEC v Dirks 463 US 646 ( 1983) 662 
38Above nl I , 633 
39 Above n I I , 632 
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does not restrict liability to where the trader violates a duty to the 
owner of the information. Once again if the tipping scenario is taken, 
the wrongfulness of the tipping action does not depend on whether 
there has been a misuse of inside information belonging to the public 
issuer. Liability arises if the tipper either advises or encourages 
another to trade or communicates the information with the 
knowledge or belief that the tippee will trade . Unless a pragmatic 
approach to liability is taken market activity may be significantly 
hampered. To illustrate this proposition, consider the following. 
Take the common occurrence of Company executives meeting with 
investment analysts to di sc uss the company's performance. In the US 
case SEC v Bausch & Lomb lnc4 0 Shulman , the Company's chief 
executive officer was prosecuted for negligently revealing to analysts 
the negative impact that problems with one of the company's 
products would have on the company's performance. For weeks the 
company had been asked by analysts for an indication , and due to 
either fatigue or inadvertence , Shulman disclosed the information. 
The disclosure caused a rash of trading by the analysts and their 
advisees. The S.E.C's prosecution was unsuccessful because the Court 
held that negligent misconduct was not proscribed by Rule I Ob-5 . 
In comparison the New Zealand framework does not distinguish 
between different types of conduct. Our framework does not take into 
account the wrongfulness of any action because the focus in not 
whether there has been a breach of fiduciary duty or detrimental use 
of confidential information. By revealing the information arguably 
Shulman was prima facie advising investors to account for the 
impending problems the Company was to face. Irrespective of his 
negligence or the context in which the information was given, in the 
New Zealand context Shulman would be liable for tipping. 41 Moreover 
40420 F Supp 1226 (SONY 1976) 
411n the New Zealand context the words "adv ise or encourage" can be construed 
widely. The Securities Commission has considered that the fact that a person 
was regularly consulted on share purchase details and kept up to date on the 
price of the shares meant that that person could be regarded as a person who 
advised or encouraged a purchase. (Sec Securities Commission, "Report on 
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the analyst would be liable as tippees arguably having received 
information in confidence from an insider and trading on that 
information. 
Tipping activity 1s sanctioned on the basis that parity of information 
in the market must be maintained. This policy simply sanctions 
tipping of inside information without any gloss. If the emphasis were 
to shift and instead the issue became whether or not a fiduciary 
relationship had been breached by improper disclosure, 
consideration could be given to the nature of the tipping activity. In 
the Bausch & Lomb case, the consideration would focus on whether 
Shulman's actions were negligent and possibly outside the ambit of 
insider trading liability rather than simply whether Shulman tipped. 
3 Takeover Notice 
The takeover situation 1s another example of the problem of 
achieving market efficiency while working within the regulatory 
framework. Difficulties arise when the directors of Public issuers, 
which are either potential offerors or targets of planned takeovers, 
discuss with shareholders the hypothetical but possible takeover 
situation. Take the example of Public Issuer A which is planning a 
takeover of Public issuer B. The directors of A make an offer to B's 
Board. During the course of negotiations B's directors disclose price 
sensitive information to A .4 2 A makes a bid for B under the 
Companies Amendment Act 1963. While directors of A may have a 
defence to any tipping liability, the directors of B will be liable for 
tipping 111 light of the information they made available to the bidder 
and their advisers. 4 3 The liability arises in that the directors of B 
enquiry into dealings in the voting securities of Gulf Resources Pacific Limited 
(formerly City Realtics Limited) during the period November 1989 to January 
1990," June 1992, para 9.5) 
42Example refers to the takeover notice required by the Companies Amendment 
Act 1963 
43 Arguably Directors can simply avoid tipping liability by simply releasing 
the information on which they base their recommendation. As discussed below 
at note 61 if deals arc being done based on non-public information maybe as a 
policy consideration the level of disclosure should be raised. 
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disclosed sensitive information 
securities in s.44 
to A knowing that A was likely to buy 
Moreover the directors of B may find themselves in the predicament 
of recommending a course of action to their shareholders in respect 
of the offer from A . If the price offered by A is in their opinion 
reflective of the worth of the company the directors of B may 
recommend that the shareholders sell. This recommendation would 
constitute advising or encouraging shareholders to sell and hence 
tipping liability will attach to the directors of B . The inefficiency of 
the situation ,s compounded when the Securities Commission assumes 
that directors will be in a position to see the interests of shareholders 
in takeover situations45, a position which is clearly compromised. 
If the directors advise the shareholders that the offer is particularly 
beneficial to the shareholders, given what they know , the directors 
will be liable to the bidder company . Alternatively, no liability will 
attach in this respect if the offer is detrimental to the shareholders. 
However, in the latter instance , the directors surely owe a duty to 
disclose relevant information to the shareholders . The directors are 
effectively on the one hand trying to avoid tipping liability to the 
bidder and on the other hand trying to meet the fiduciary obligations 
owed to the Company. It has been suggested that the only safe course 
for the directors to follow is to make no recommendations 
whatsoever .4 6 Clearly this course of action is impractical given that 
the realities of the situation require "open" discussions between all 
parties. Safeguards which are lacking under the present framework 
must be developed which protect the interests of the companies 
involved while also facilitating discussion between offeror and 
offeree. While it is desirable that the net protecting inside 
information is widely cast the proscription should not threaten 
44section 9(a)(b)(i ) 
45see Securities Commission , "Insider Trading- Report to the Minister of 
Justice" (2 Yols). December 1987, para. 8.2 
46A Yan Schie Insider Trading , Nomin ee Disclosure and Fw11res Dealing: An 
analysis of the Sernriries A111 end111e11t Ac! I 988 ( I ed , Butterworths, 
Wellington , I 994) 25 
l"-W LloP.."P.Y 
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corporate executives with prosecution for tipping if they wish to 
facilitate commercial transactions by open dialogue with the 
investment community. Achieving the balance is 
efficiency. 
4 Call for a pragmatic approach 
crucial to market 
It is suggested that the development of the New Zealand regime must 
be sensitive to market realities. 4 7 Market activity may be 
significantly impeded by the proscription of selective disclosure of 
price-sensitive information to professionals like analysts if too fixed 
an interpretation is placed on the statute. At present there would 
appear to be little room to consider whether the information the 
subject of the selective disclosure (effectively tipping) is improper 
and therefore proscribed . Consideration should allow determination 
to be made as to whether the person making the disclosure (the 
tipper) expects a personal profit or other benefit from the disclosure 
thereby making the disclosure improper and i I legal. Instead New 
Zealand attempts to maintain the parity of information objective 
by presently proscribing all disclosures to analysts of inside 
information. 
It 1s suggested that market efficiency requires that pragmatic 
approach is taken particularly with respect to selective disclosures 
falling under the proscriptive ambit of tipping; one which embraces 
the views taken by the Supreme Court in Dirks. The US Supreme Court 
noted in Dirks that:48 
47The Australian legislation is also broad in its proscription however it is 
notable that the Courts have also taken a pragmatic approach in resolving cases. 
In Hooker Investments Ptd Ltd v Baring Bras Halkerston & Partners Securities 
Ltd & Ors Aust. Sec. L Rep (CCH) 76,105 (N.S.W. Ct. App. 1986) insider 
trading was alleged to occur because an issuer had disclosed non public 
financial forecasts to a group of underwriters in advance of a new offering of its 
securities. Although this activity was clearly in breach of the proscription 
against the selective non disclosure of price sensitive information to one 
believed to trade on that information , the Court resolved the case on a defence 
that no insider trading violation occurs if the counterparty is aware of the non 
disclosure. 
48463 us 646 ( 1983) 662 
5 
Virtually 
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"Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person 
knowingly receives material nonpublic information from an insider 
and trades on it could have an inhibiting influence on the role of the 
market analysts . which the S.E.C itself recognizes is necessary to 
the preservation of a healthy market. It is common place for 
analysts to "ferret out and analyze information" . and this often is 
done by meetings with and questioning officers and others who arc 
insiders." 
Enlarging the application of pragmatic approach 
all recent insider trading cases Ill the us 
transactions based on factual information rather than 
focus 
hints 
on 
or 
suggestions resulting 111 advantage . There are few US cases to date 
for trading on the where the defendant has been held accountable 
opinions or the credibility of an insider even 
opinion or credibility has been founded on 
information. 
if that insider's tip, 
undisclosed inside 
Consider the following hypothetical. Public Issuer X's financial 
executive (insider A) is aware that X has recently made an important 
technological discovery Insider A receives a telephone call from an 
outside investment analyst, B . B wants information from A regarding 
the present financial health and future prospects of X . In the course 
of their discussion A comments explicitly on publicly available 
information; evaluating that information as well as publicly 
unavailable information based on experience and expertise. Last year 
before the discovery A had projected to B a realistic but constrained 
forecast of the Company's performance. This year, while constrained 
by the need to keep information concerning the discovery a secret 
and also confined by securities laws. A nevertheless communicates to 
B the "spirit" of the new discovery 111 summarizing X's financial 
position . While clearly A has made an important unlawful disclosure 
to B, benefiting B and B 's clients. does any liability for insider 
trading hang on A? Has any real information passed between the 
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parties? It 1s suggested that the injury to X and other market 
investors is the same whether or not there has been an unlawful 
disclosure of factual information or veiled information. Both 
types of information are indistinguishable on principal and should 
fall equally within the definition of "inside information" under 
section 2. 
The New Zealand Securities Commission 111 its Report on the Affairs 
of Regal Salmon Limited4 9 addressed the issue as to what extent 
deductions or inferences drawn by a recipient from information of a 
very general nature provided to that recipient would come within the 
meaning of inside information. The Commission suggested that in 
considering the issue the Courts should be guided by the Appellate 
Court pronouncements of Mcinerney J in Waldron v GreenSO: 
"Our section docs not require that information be "specific". In 
many cases a hint may suggest information or may enable an 
inference to be drawn as to information. Information about 
impending stock movements or share movements may often be veiled. 
Discussion concerning such movement may often take the form of 
"mooting" but not deciding the matter." 
Further the Commission noted a commentators view that:51 
" ... although the information which has motivated trading must be 
something more than a hunch or a shrewd or educated guess, any 
opinions. predictions. deductions. and suchlike perceptions capable 
of being made only by an insider will be sufficient..." 
49New Zealand Securities Commission Report of an Inquiry into Aspects of the 
Affairs of Regal Salmon Limited including Trading in its Listed Securities, 
Securities Commission Wellington, 28 July 1994, 117, pl59 
50( 1977-78) CLC-CCH 29728 at 29733 
51 Bennetts, "Regulation of Insider Trading: The Australian Experience" 3 Cant. 
L. Rev 254,265 
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This recognition that insider trading does not simply concern 
transactions based on factual information but can be based on hints 
or suggestions conferring advantage is broad minded and pragmatic. 
6 Pragmatism: latitude for a defence? 
In his Solicitors op1111011 prepared in the Wilson Neill case Young 
recognized that in certain situations a strict standard of proof might 
not be commercially realistic and that in practice the Courts were 
unlikely to impose liability 111 the absence of fault.52 On this basis 
Young suggested that it was open to the Courts to imply an "absence of 
fault" defence under the statute. A defendant who was proven to have 
possessed inside information at the relevant time could raise an 
absence of fault defence by showing that he or she had 
conscientiously considered the matter at the time of the transaction 
and had reached a reasonably based view that their knowledge did not 
amount to inside information.5 3 The Court of Appeal held however 
that a defence of total absence of fault has no bearing on liability 
under section 7 or section 9 of the Act. The Court held that the only 
defenses available to alleged insiders are those provided 111 the 
Securities Amendment Act 1988. 
It is suggested that there may be instances where elements of absence 
of fault can enter into conduct which constitutes insider trading. By 
way of example, although most buying and selling is done 
voluntarily, there are instances where a disposition of securities may 
be by Court order or other quasi-judicial body under the Commerce 
Act 1986, Part II of the Securities Amendment Act 1988 or possibly 
the Takeovers Act 1993. Also it is possible that a put option may be 
granted at a time when a person 1s not an insider but the 
counterparty chooses to exercise that option at a time when the 
52 Above n 11 , 646 (Opinion of W G G A Young QC. Provided Pursuant to Section 
17 Securities Amendment Act 1988 as to Allegations of Insider Trading in 
Wilson Neill Shares June 1990-Scptcmbcr 1991 par.2.18) 
53 Above n 525 
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person 1s an insider.54 It is suggested that in any case where there is 
an element of involuntariness or absence of fault it may be 
appropriate for the Court to dismiss an action on the basis of a no fault 
defence. 
US case law has developed in a pragmatic way in this regard. The 
decision of most interest is Dirks v S.EC. 5 5 Raymond Dirks, a securities 
analyst became aware of widespread fraud at Equity Funding 
Corporation of America. 
employees of the Company. 
His sources were former and current 
Dirks relayed his information to Equity 
Funding's present and former auditors and to the Wall Street Journal. 
The Journal contacted the SEC who investigated. The fraudulent 
scheme collapsed shortly thereafter. In the course of the 
investigation it was discovered that Dirks had relayed his information 
to certain institutional investors, many of whom sold their stock in 
the Company. 
that: 
The SEC brought an action against Dirks commenting 
"It is well established that corporate insiders who trade on the 
basis of material, non-public information ... violate ... Rule !Ob-
5 .. "Ti ppees" of corporate insiders, who themselves trade are equally 
liable. Moreover. both corporate insiders and their tippees are 
liable for the trading violations of those whom they in turn tip. 
Even where the tipper does not himself engage in trading, he aids 
and abets the violation by providing the means by which the 
wrongful act occurs. ,,56 
The Commission cited authority that tippees of corporate insiders 
might be liable as participants after the fact in the insider's breach of 
fiduciary duty.57 At the Lower Court level the judge held that:58 
54 Above n46, 
55445 U.S. at 230 n 12 
56[ 1981] Fed. Sec L Rep (CCH) 82,812 
57445 US at 230 nl2 
58681 F.2d at 839 
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" ... the obligation of corporate fiduciaries pass to all those whom 
they disclose their information before it has been disseminated to 
the public at large. Thus Dirks ... became subject to his informants' 
disclose or refrain obligation." 
This opinion effectively endorsed the SEC position that the tippee 
"steps in to the shoes" of the insider/tipper and assumes the I atter's 
fiduciary obligations. The Supreme Court however held that the 
illegal tipping and tippee trading occurs only when the selective 
disclosure is deemed to be 'improper'; where for example the insider 
tips a friend or expects to receive a pecuniary gain from the selective 
disclosure.59 On this basis Dirks therefore was not liable for tipping. 
In taking this line the Court took a pragmatic approach to tipping 
liability. 
The Australian cases also limit liability by provide a defence where 
the counterparty is aware of the nondisclosure. In light of the 
pragmatic development of case law as seen in other jurisdictions, the 
New Zealand courts should consider proposition like the no fault 
defence if such proposals allow for a commercially realistic and 
sensible development of the regulatory framework. An example 
where a defence might be considered appropriate for the sake of 
commercial reality is found in the common due diligence procedures. 
7 The problem with due diligence 
The due diligence exercise can raise significant insider trading 
implications. Take the following example. Company A is a New 
Zealand company whose shares are listed on the Stock Exchange. 65 % 
of A is owned by Seller Limited which enters into an arrangement to 
sell the shareholding to Buyer Limited . After some negotiations 
Buyer agrees to buy the shares on the condition that it be allowed to 
conduct a due diligence exercise. Usually such an exercise will mean 
59464 us 646 ( 1983) 
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a complete examination of the books of the company and a review of 
the company's major contracts and commitments. 
It is not unusual that 111 the course of due diligence Buyer receives 
profit forecasts which have not been publicly released. In the 
example above, Buyer was given access to half year results which had 
not been publicly released. In providing information under a due 
diligence exercise, the directors as insiders are providing 
information which is price sensitive to Buyer knowing that Buyer is 
likely to buy securities in the Company. 
caught under section 9( 1 )(b )(i) of the Act. 
Furthermore it is 
examination 
not usual that Buyer's 
on behalf of Buyer. 
The directors are clearly 
auditors conduct due 
The company directors diligence 
would tn confidence be providing the auditor with inside 
information. The auditor by reason of having received the 
information in confidence from officers of the company becomes an 
insider: section 3( I )(c) of the Act. The Auditors role is then to provide 
the information to Buyer. In providing the information to Buyer in 
this way the auditor is also clearly caught by the provisions in section 
9 of the Act.60 
A disgruntled shareholder may consider bringing an action against 
the exposed directors and/or auditor. Section 8(2) of the Act only 
provides a defence where the purchase of securities results from a 
take-over offer made by the insider in accordance with section 4 of 
the Companies Amendment Act 1963. Arguably there should be a 
defence available in other respect of block acquisitions given that the 
directors were acting bona fide in what they believed to be the best 
interests of the company. The Auditor could argue that the 
information was not given in confidence because it was always 
intended that they would pass the information on. Obviously there are 
601t is arguably that steps could be taken to minimise exposure. ie prompt 
disclosure of price sensitive information, limiting the scope of the exercise. In 
any event Public issuers, directors and advisers or public issuers should 
beware that due diligence exercises may lead to liability under the Act. 
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difficulties with these arguments however in the interests of market 
efficiency maybe the no fault defence should be available. '61 
D Finite Links: Limited Liability 
1 New Zealand: Three tiers of liability 
There are only a finite number of links in the chain of liability in the 
present New Zealand framework. Because of this a number of cases 
would fall outside the ambit of the legislation. Consider for example 
the following hypothetical. Party A an insider passes inside 
information 111 confidence to Party B believing that B will buy or 
encourage another to buy securities. B does indeed encourage C to 
buy. C buys. In this example, A 62, B 63 and c64 are insiders. If the 
information in fact passed from C onto D however, the parties would 
cease to be liable because of the limited tiers of liability in section 9 of 
the Act. Furthermore, no liability would attach to party D because of 
the limited three tier liability in the definition of insiders. 
2 The US: special relationship test 
Our limited framework for liability can be contrasted with the US 
position and the development of the "special relationship" test. In 
the 1980 decision of Chiarella v United States6 5 the Supreme Court 
61 There is one view that directors ought not to disclose any information in 
these circumstances as the purchaser should not be able to access non-public 
information simply because of the block acquisition. In support of this view the 
listing requirements 8.1.1 (d) requires disclosure of Relevant Information at the 
time it is given to another person who is likely to use it in deciding whether or 
not to purchase shares. It has been suggested that the thrust of recent 
legislation in this area is to put all relevant information in the market place. If 
deals arc being done based on non-public information perhaps the level of 
disclosure is too low7 (sec P Ratner and C Quinn, "Insider Trading", New 
Zealand Law Society Seminar, March 1990, p 18.) 
62 section 9( I )(b)(ii) 
63section 9(a)(i) 
64 section 7( I )(a) 
65455 U.S. 222 ( 1980) 
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addressed the application of section IO(b) and rule lOb-s.66 Vincent 
Chiarella worked for the financial printing firm of Pandick Press. 
Among the documents he handled were five announcements of 
takeover offers. Without disclosing his knowledge, Chiarella 
purchased stocks 111 the targets and sold the shares at a profit after 
announcement of the tender offers. The U.S. attorney prosecuted 
Chiarella for an intentional violation of rule I Ob-5 and section I O(b) 
of the Securities Exchange Act 1934. The Supreme Court held that the 
disclose or abstain rule app lied only when there was a pre-existing 
fiduciary relationship with the investors.67 This relationship exists 
by virtue of the trader's fiduciary status 111 the public issuer. The 
Court held that: 
"anyone- corporate insider or not - who regularly receives material 
nonpublic information may not use that information to trade 111 
securities without incurring an affirmative duty ot disclose. "68 
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's conviction of Chiarella 
on the grounds that he had no relationship of trust and confidence 
with those from whom he bought.69 The fiduciary relationship was 
with Pandick Press the employer and not the bidder corporation and 
therefore Chiarella was under no obligation to disclose.7 OT he 
66 Under Rule I Ob-5 it is considered a fraudulent practice for an insider to 
trade on the basis of material inside information not known to the market. Rule 
I Ob-5 applies to an insider who has a duty of confidentiality of a fiduciary or 
contractual nature with regard to a company and its shareholders, such as 
members of the board of directors . employees. lawyers and accountants. 
Similarly, Rule IOb-5 applies to those who receive information from an insider 
(tippees), though only if the insider has breached the duty of confidentiality to 
the company or its shareholders and if the tippee was or should have been aware 
of the breach. 
67 a tippee inherits the fiduciary duty of the tipper and will only be liable for 
insider trading if the tipper has breached a duty not to disclose information 
and the tippee knows or should have known of the breach (Dirks v SEC 463 US 
646 ( 1983)) 
68 588 F 2d 1358. 1365 (2d Cir 1978) 
69445 U.S. at 230-1 
70 The result reached by the Supreme Court in Chiarella was unsatisfactory in 
that many individuals have relationships which result in their possession of 
inside information without the requisite fiduciary connection to the owner of 
the information. The Misappropriation theory developed to address this 
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Chiarella decision essentially imposes liability on any party at any 
point in the chain of liability where there has been a breach of a 
"special relationship". The test of whether there is a breach of a 
"special relationship" is whether the insider or tipper gains from the 
tipping activity. The distinctive feature of the "special relationship" 
theory is its expansive application particularly 111 relation to 
tipping activity as discussed in the following. 
3 Applying the "Special Relationship" test to 
tipping activity 
Take the example of Party A who is an insider of Public Issuer X. 
Party A is in possession of material confidential information. Party A 
(the tipper) tips Party B (the tippee). The tippee then trades on the 
basis of the tip. The tipper naturally has a special relationship with 
the public issuer. Arguably the tipper also has a special 
relationship and owes a fiduciary duty to both existing shareholders 
and those who will subsequently become shareholders. Furthermore , 
although the tippee has no relationship of trust with the party on the 
other side of the transaction, once the liability of the tipper is 
established Chiarella suggests that the tippee could conceivably be 
held liable as a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of 
fiduciary duty by tipping.71 Essentially therefore although the 
tippee has no direct relationship with the counterparty to the 
transaction the tippee assumes the tippers special relationship with 
the counterparty by virtue of simply having received the 
information from the tipper. 
In this way the "special relationship" theory can be contorted to fit 
even the most complex tipping scenario. Consider the situation where 
situation. The theory is consistent with the proposition that insider trading and 
tipping is harmful because it results in the misuse of confidential information 
belonging to another party. The misappropriation theory states that rule I Ob-5 
is violated where there is a trading on material non public information in 
breach of a duty to the information source. 
71445 U.S. at 230 
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an insider A tips an outside party B who does not trade on the basis of 
the tip but in fact tips another party C. Party C then sells shares to 
someone who previously owned no shares 111 Public Issuer X. By 
tipping, the tipper is 111 breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the 
person who bought the shares from C 111 that the fiduciary duty is 
owed to present and future shareholders of X. Furthermore, the 
tippees B and C are liable as participants after the fact in the tippers 
violation.7 2 It has been suggested that a simpler way of analysing the 
situation is to see the tippees as simply "stepping into the shoes" of 
the insider/tipper and assuming the insider/tipper's fiduciary 
relationship with the shareholders present and future. 73 The US 
framework IS based on the need to ensure the protection of another's 
information and because of this the us framework for liability 
c learly extends beyond the New Zealand regime. 
E Problematic Enforcement issues 
I Shareholder responsibility 
The onus of enforcement is on the public issuer or the aggrieved 
shareholder. Often the initiative for enforcement falls solely on the 
aggrieved shareholder as the public issuer through its directors are 
loathe to instigate action against fellow directors or other company 
officers. This 1s 111 contrast with the US system where the SEC 
operates a strong centralised enforcement agency.7 4 In New 
72Ks Wang "Recent Developments in the Federal Law Regulating Stock Market 
Inside Trading" 66 
73Above n 71 
74rt has been noted that private litigation has not been a necessary or even an 
effective weapon in the detection or deterrence of insider trading in America. 
This is partially due to the ability of government actions to obtain ancillary 
relief that provides private remedies within the government prosecutions. 
Occasionally the publicity surrounding government prosecutions stimulate 
collateral private actions. These suits have been described as parasitic because 
they not only free ride on the government's evidence. but more frequently seek 
to share in any profits the government's successful prosecution has wrested 
from the defendant. American federal securities law also relies on the class 
action and contingency fee devices. This not only allows large numbers of small 
claims to be joined together to make the suit economically advised. but the 
contingency fee devise overcomes the natural risk aversion of such small 
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Zealand's de-centralised system aggrieved shareholders themselves 
bring enforcement actions. The problem is that often the aggrieved 
shareholders do not have the financial muscle to see through lengthy 
and complex proceedings nor is there sufficient access to information 
to successfully support proceedings. The New Zealand framework has 
attempted to redress these problems by sections 17 and 18 of the Act. 
2 Section 17 
Section 17 of the Act provides an opportunity for shareholders who 
believe insider trading has occurred to apply to the Securities 
Commi sion for approval to obtain from a lawyer an opinion as to 
whether or not the public issuer has a cause of action against 
suspected insiders. In the Wilson Neill case an application was made 
by shareholders pursuant to section 17 of the Act. Although the 
application was successful the procedural delays 111 obtaining the 
final opinion produced by Dr Young highlights the inefficiencies of 
the present framework. 
Gaynor, an aggrieved shareholder first wrote to the Securities 
Commission on I August 1991 requesting that an opinion be produced 
pursuant to section 17 of the Act. After some delays the Securities 
Commission advised Gaynor that contrary to its earlier advice, the 
Commission did not propose at that stage to approve a barrister or 
solicitor for the purposes of section 17 of the Act. 
On 9 October 1991, another application under section 17 of the Act was 
made to the Securities Commission. This time the applicants 
comprised not only of Gaynor, but also other institutional investors 
involved in the alleged insider trading. This time , the Securities 
Commission agreed to appoint a Barrister for the purposes of securing 
a section 17 oprn1on. Arguably, the change 111 the Commission's 
investors. In combination they provide a vehicle for the private prosecution of 
securities law violations. (sec further R Tomasic, "Corporations Law 
Enforcement Strategies in Australia", 1990 Sydney Law Review, Yol 12, p 192.) 
36 
position was the result of the additional pressure of the institutional 
applicants. Where one shareholder's request was denied, a collective 
request from several investors including institutional investors was 
successful. It is suggested that this highlights the difficulty with 
proceeding under the Act as a single aggrieved shareholder without 
the support of collective pressure from other aggrieved shareholders. 
3 Other available avenues ? 
Another option said to be available to aggrieved shareholders is an 
action against current and former directors for breach of their 
fiduciary duty to the company. This option would be exercised under 
Part VIII ss 131-138 Companies Act 1993.7 5 It should be remembered 
however that the shareholders of the target Company would have to 
bring an action. The shareholders would have to prove that the 
company suffered damage. 
damage did the company suffer? 
The difficulty arises at this point, what 
F Time for a More Proactive Approach 
1 The role of the Securities Commission 
It has been suggested that one of the most disappointing aspects of the 
enforcement framework 1s the lack of support from the Securities 
Commission to aggrieved shareholders. 7 6 As one aggrieved 
shareholder in the Wilson Neill case has noted:77 
"Not once during the four years did the Commission contact me to 
keep me informed about developments. I had to constantly phone or 
write to the Commission to seek information and this information 
was often reluctantly given." 
75Il has been suggested that Director's liability insurance would cover any 
actions. It should be noted however that it is likely that the insurance policies 
would exclude liability for actions in the case of tipper activity 
76Abovc 1131, 65 
77 Above 1131, 65 
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In the absence of a centralised enforcement regime 111 New Zealand, 
the Securities Commission must surely take a more central role in 
overseeing the mechanics of the legislative framework. Although 
the statutory authority for taking a more proactive role is somewhat 
deficient, the policy reasons 7 8 behind the legislative framework 
must still encourage and demand the Securities Commission take a 
more active role in enforcement. 
A recent report? 9 suggests that the framework be widened to allow 
the Securities Commission standing to apply to the Court for orders in 
relation to insider trading. The report notes that:80 
"[there is] often understandable reluctance of public issuers to 
instigate proceedings for insider trading where the cost of bringing 
proceedings are borne by the public issuer itself. It seems likely 
that insider trading laws would be more effectively enforced if the 
Commission had standing to bring proceedings." 
In light of the Wilson Neill case there is no doubt that the 
effectiveness of the enforcement provisions would benefit from the 
Securities Commission playing a more proactive role. Arguably it is 
the cost factor that has resulted in the Commission taking a less active 
78In 1980 the New Zealand Securities Commission stated the policy basis for 
securities regulation in New Zealand as follows: 
(I) The objects of commercial law are to aid the transaction of business by 
honest and fair means. 
(2) The law should ensure that the public is informed fairly and in good 
time, both of the terms of the offer and of the information relevant to 
making decisions about it. 
(3) The law should attach responsibility and liability for dishonest and 
unfair conduct where they fairly belong. 
(4) The remedies should be simple , direct, effective and as inexpensive as 
possible. 
(5) There should be equality before the law (see Proposals for the 
Enact111e111 of Regulations Under the Securities Act 1978 ( I 980)) 
79securities Commission discussion paper "Review of the Law on Insider 
Trading", I l August 1994,5 
80securities Commission discussion paper "Review of the Law on Insider 
Trading" , I I August 1994, 5 
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role to date in enforcement proceedings. 
that81 : 
It has been suggested 
"if the Commission is to have the power to bring proceedings .. . it 
may be appropriate lO confer on the Court the discretion to provide 
for quite a full recovery of costs incurred by the Commission in 
respect of any proceedings brought under Part I, also Part II, of the 
Amendment Act." 
2 Enforcement powers in the United States 
It has been noted that the enforcement of insider trading 1s so 
centralised in the United States is a natural effect of the offence.8 2 
Insider trading is an offence of stealth whose presence initially can 
only be detected inferentially .8 3 The SEC's enforcement efforts are 
heavily dependent on the electronic market surveillance systems 
used by regulatory organisations.8 4 The organisations first monitor 
trading activity through computer systems that identify abnormal 
price or volume changes within seconds of their occurrence. 
Once an unusual activity is detected a review of wire releases 
determines whether the activity can be explained by industry or 
company specific information.85 If the activity cannot be explained 
the specific company is contacted to determine if there is an 
unannounced corporate event. If the activity is identified as suspect, 
the brokerage firm executing the transactions 1s identified and 
through the company a profile of the trading customers 1s 
prepared . 86 This information through a search database ASAM to 
identify the trader's relationship if any to the company . 
81 Securities Commission discussion paper "Review of the Law on Insider 
Trading" , I I August I 994, 6 
82 Above n I I.627 
83 Above n I 1,627 
84 Above n 11 ,627 
85 Above n I 1,627 
86 Above n I 1,627 
The ASAM 
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database holds general information 111 relation to 500,000 corporate 
officers, di rectors, attorneys, accountants, and other individuals 
having corporate contact.8 7 Once the investigators believe that there 
1s sufficient evidence to support insider trading, the evidence is 
forwarded to the government prosecutors. 88 
In 1984 the SEC has had the authority under the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act to seek civil penalties up to triple the insider-trading 
profits against insider traders.8 9 This provision has been 
subsequently amended to enable the SEC to apply this sanction to 
brokerage houses, investment advisory firms and other organisations 
who fail to take adequate steps to prevent insider trading by their 
employees. 90 By expanding sanctions in this way to employers the 
system effectively increases incentives for employers to vigorously 
supervise their employees. 
It is clear that the New Zealand enforcement process is some way 
behind the US system described above. New Zealand also lags behind 
Australia which has a surveillance of market activity (SOMA) 
software system which was introduced by the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) In 1989.9 1 Arguably if the Securities Commission IS 
give the power to effectively police the enforcement framework, the 
de-centralised system we presently are confined to will have to take 
on a more centralised nature. If indeed we are moving 111 this 
direction consideration will need to be given to a system in which the 
Commission can actively and efficiently operate.92 
87 Above n I I ,627 
88111 I 988 the US Congress augmented available detection procedures by 
providing a bounty award of up to I 0% of the government recovery for those who 
assist the government's detection or insider trading: The Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act I 988, amended s.21 A(c) Securities Exchange 
Act 15 USC 78 to provide for this award. 
89us Securities Exchange Act , s.21 (d)(2)(A) 
90 Above n I I, 629 
91 Above n I 1,698 
92considcration will need to be given to the enforcement powers that the 
Securities Commission will require. Arguably the single most important power 
would be the power to obtain information from anyone. Once a matter is 
identified as appropriate for investigation, there should be no impediment, 
3. 
40 
Call for a more proactive approach to the 
problem of insider trading 
There are significant difficulties with the present regulatory 
framework in New Zealand. The first difficulty lies in the detection of 
the offence of insider trading. There 1s no electronic surveillance 
system in place that can monitor insider trading activity on which to 
base prosecutions. It is suggested that in the absence of systems found 
111 the United States or even Australia, the must be legislative reform 
to provide incentives for people to report insider traders. In the US 
the obligations on employers and organisations to monitor trading 
activity 1s an example of the type of incentives that may need 
consideration. Also the provision for a bounty or award to be paid to 
informers may require consideration. 
There are inherent difficulty in proving the elements of the offence 
successfully. As discussed above, the evidential difficulties are 
impenetrable 111 some instances where the plaintiff 1s required to 
prove that the insider received the information rn confidence. 
Perhaps the legislation should provide the Court with the ability to 
infer that the information was passed in confidence by the facts of 
the case particularly in light of the fact that: 
insider trading cases ... are proven by creating a mosaic of 
circumstantial evidence which, when considered as a whole , lead to 
the inference that the insider possessed inside information or a 
tipper communicated non-public information. For example, an 
unusual trading pattern alone probably would not be enough from 
which to draw the necessary inferences for insider trading 
liability. but if that evidence were coupled with the opportunity to 
receive non-public information, the totality of the circumstantial 
save for privileged communications and the right against self-incrimination, 
that fetters the ability to get the evidence it seeks. The position must be 
achieved whereby market investors arc assured that once detected, the 
enforcement entity has tools to identify and gather the necessary evidence to 
prosecute wrongdoers. 
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evidence would be sufficient to support the inference that the 
trader possessed non-public information at the time of the 
transaction. 93 
Similarly a reversal of the onus of proof could be considered to 
require the insider to establish that the insider did not pass the 
information in confidence. This reversal of the onus of proof may be 
justifiable on the basis that the insider and tipper arguably knows the 
context of the situation better than the plaintiff. 
The second area of difficulty concerns the need to encourage the law 
to develop pragmatically to cater for the commercial realities and 
characteristics that surround inside trading activity. In the final 
analysis, a regulatory approach that stifles market efficiencies 1s 
unwelcome. 
The last problem area relates to enforcement of the regulatory 
framework. It is suggested that the detection, investigation and 
prosecution of insiders should be the New Zealand Securities 
Commission first priority. If a central system of enforcement is not 
desirable or likely9 4 penalties that have a significant deterrent 
effect may need to be considered. For example section I 6(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act 1934 (US) provides that, regardless of 
whether or not the person possesses inside information, all profit 
made by officers. directors, and shareholders beneficially own111g 
more than I O % of the company's shares in dealings involving the 
company's shares. wi 11 belong to the company if the sale and 
purchase of shares occurs within six months. 
stated that95: 
93 Above n I 1,700 
One commenator has 
94Thc 1994 Annual Report of the Securities Commission states that : "Broadly 
speaking our aim will be, consistent with the policy of the Act , to strengthen 
procedures available for shareholder enforcement. We will not propose an 
increase in the role of the Commission or other centrally funded enforcement 
agency." 
95 Becrworth, Insider Trading - Current Issues ( 1989) Butterworths Company 
Law Bulletin [ 187] 
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Section 16 has been working away like a bilge pump for fifty-five 
years. The beauty of the system is that it removes any moral taint 
and eliminates any questions of motive and the need to define what 
is inside information. 
It 1s suggested that the enactment of a similar provision m New 
Zealand should be considered as providing a significant deterrent 
effect given the weakness of surveillance of the securities market. 
V CONCLUSION 
The US experience is an illustration of a regulatory system that has 
developed pragmatically to accommodate socially desirable flows of 
information. It is suggested that the problem with insider trading 1s 
its misuse of information. Care must be taken in New Zealand to 
ensure that the Courts have an opportunity to guide the New Zealand 
proscription of inside trading in an efficient and workable manner. 
The greatest problem with the present framework however centres 
on enforcement efforts. Current sanctions available to the Securities 
Commission are too modest and do not invoke a sufficiently proactive 
stance from the Commission. Private actions by aggrieved investors 
are hamstrung by the issues of proof and high level of costs involved. 
The Wilson Neill is a true example of the excessive delays and 
inordinate efforts required to achieve a result that in the end may not 
be worth it. To be fair the Wilson Neill case was a test case and some of 
the procedural problems may have been addressed and overcome. It 
is suggested however that this may not be enough. 
In the final analysis the problem of insider trading should be 
recognized as a national problem. Arguably the only cost of deterring 
insider trading by vesting a centralised entity with enforcement 
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powers to recover more than the defendant's illicit ga111s and the cost 
of empowering the courts to provide ancillary relief where 
appropriate to compensate those proximately harmed by the insider's 
misconduct must be paid. 
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